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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
sioner dissenting.13 Upon reargument before the full Commission
this finding was affirmed, but there were four Commissioners dis-
senting.' 4 On appeal the Supreme Court, in affirming the judgment
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, said:
"That body professed to follow the decision in the
Colorado case and we think it did so. The court there held
that in the issuance of a certificate the public convenience and
necessity the -Commission need not determine with mathe-
matical exactness the extent of the burden imposed upon inter-
state commerce by the operation of a branch line; that such
burden might involve various elements, and if upon the whole
proof the conclusion was warranted that continued operation
would in fact unreasonably burden the interstate commerce of
the carrier the Commission was justified in authorizing aban-
donment."
The question as to whether public convenience and necessity per-
mit an abandonment therefore appears to be one of fact. The dis-
cretion of the Commission accordingly would play a great part in the
determination of this question. The writer feels that in the Long
Island case the Commission may well have refused to issue the cer-
tificate In that event there can be little doubt that a finding that
public convenience and necessity did not permit abandonment would
have not been disturbed by the Supreme Court.
SIDNEY BRANDES.
INJUNCTION-BY ONE STATE AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
IN ANOTHER STATE-ENFORCEMENT.
The state of New Jersey seeks a decree in personam praying for
an injunction restraining the city of New York from dumping
garbage into the ocean off the coast of New Jersey.' This resulted
in interference with the fishing industry of New Jersey, destroying
and tearing nets. The garbage carried in suspension by the sea made
bathing unpleasant, and that of greater bulk, carried upon the surface,
was washed up on the beaches, necessitating its removal. The action
is brought in a court of equity. The injuries are continuing. There
is no adequate remedy at law. The federal courts have jurisdiction.2
"Long Island Railway Co. abandonment, 162 Interstate Commerce Rep.
363 (1930).
"* 166 Interstate Commerce Rep. 671 (1930).
1New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U. S. 473, 51 Sup. Ct. 519 (1931).
2U. S. Const., Art. III, Sec. 2: "The judicial power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, to all Cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdic-
tion; to controversies between a state and citizens of another state."
NOTES AND COMMENT
In cases of nuisance or trespass, the place where the act occurs,
which makes possible the nuisance or trespass, is the situs of the
tort.3 The act complained of, the dumping of garbage, took place
eight, twelve and twenty miles out from the coast of New Jersey.
The territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States includes
land areas under its dominion and control, ports, harbors, bays and
other enclosed arms of the sea along its coast and a marginal belt of
the sea extending from the coastline outward a marine league or
three geographical miles.4 When the situs of the tort is outside the
territorial limits of the United States the matter of its abatement like-
wise is outside the jurisdiction of the federal courtsY However, the
situs of this tort is not the controlling factor. Both parties to the
controversy have submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the
court. A court of equity which has control of the person of the
defendant has jurisdiction of an action to restrain him from violating
the rights of plaintiff in regard to property not within its jurisdiction
and may compel obedience to its decree. 6 This is based on the prin-
ciple that courts of equity have authority to control all persons within
their own territorial limits. Without regard to the situs of the acts
creating the nuisance, the equities between the parties are considered,
and decrees in personam according to these equities are entered.1
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution used the work "con-
troversies" only to express the subject matter of its jurisdiction. The
Judiciary Act of 1789 embodied in Section 687 of the Revised Stat-
utes limited "controversies" to those of a civil nature.8 Such con-
struction is indicative of an intention not to confer on the federal
courts jurisdiction of a suit by one state which could not be enter-
tained in the courts of the other state at all. Chief Justice Marshall
condensed the reason for this in the statement: "The courts of no
country execute the penal laws of another." This case is justiciable
under the above section since it is of a civil nature.10
IMcGowan v. Columbia River Packer's Assn., 245 U. S. 352, 38 Sup. Ct.
129 (1917); Laedew v. Tennessee Copper Co., 179 Fed. 245 (C. C. S. D.
Tenn. 1910).
'Manchester v. Mass., 139 U. S. 240, 257, 258, 11 Sup. Ct. 559, 562 (1891);
La. v. Miss., 202 U. S. 1, 26 Sup. Ct. 408 (1906) ; Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon,
262 U. S. 100, 122, 123, 43 Sup. Ct. 504, 507 (1923).
Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U. S. 1, 8, 8 Sup. Ct. 811, 816
(1887); N. J. v. Sargent, 269 U. S. 328, 337, 46 Sup. Ct. 122, 124 (1926);
U. S. v. Newark Meadows Imp. Co., 173 Fed. 426 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1909).
6 Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U. S. 298 (1878); Hart v. Sansom, 110 U. S.
151, 154, 3 Sup. Ct. 586, 588 (1884) ; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 116,
10 Sup. Ct. 269, 272 (1890); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 622,
623, 32 Sup. Ct. 340, 345 (1912).
7 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (14th ed. 1918) §§899, 900.
'36 Stat. 1156 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §341 (1928) Rev. Stat. §687: "The
Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil
nature where a State is a party * * *"
'The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, 123 (U. S. 1825).
" R. I. v. Mass., 12 Pet. 657, 722, 731 (U. S. 1838) ; Ames v. Kansas, 111
U. S. 449, 463, 464, 4 Sup. Ct. 437, 447 (1883).
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In vesting in the courts of the United States the jurisdiction of
suits by one state against the citizens of another, the object is to have
the controversy determined by a national tribunal in order to avoid
any possible suspicion of partiality which might exist if the plaintiff
were obliged to sue in the courts of the state of which the defendant
was a citizen. This controversy co.uld not have been presided over
either by the courts of New York or by the courts of New Jersey.
The jurisdiction of the courts of a state is co-extensive with the
boundaries of that state. So it has been held that the courts of New
York have no jurisdiction to restrain the erection or order the removal
of structures extending into the bay or river from New Jersey." To
be cognizable, the cause of action must arise within the territorial
limits of the state.1 2
The Statutes 13 under which the defendant carried on the dump-
ing operations were a lawful and valid exercise of the federal author-
ity. This permission carries with it the obligation to perform the
dumping in such a manner as not to harm the property of anyone
else. Nothing in the Act gives the defendant immunity from liability
for injury to others committed in furtherance thereof, nor deprives
the injured party of the relief to which he is entitled. The Act per-
mitted the defendant to dump garbage into the Atlantic Ocean under
the supervision of the Supervisor of the Harbor of New York in
accordance with permits issued by him at points eight, twelve and
twenty miles southeast from Scotland Lightship and about ten, twelve
and one-half, and twenty-two miles from the New Jersey shore. The
Supervisor is designated by the President from line officers of the
Navy to act under the direction of the Secretary of War in enforcing
the provisions of the Act and detecting offenders against the same.' 4
The Act further provides the penalties for failure to obtain the neces-
sary permit and for disposal of material elsewhere than permitted.' 5
It is a recognized principle that a court of equity will not issue a
vain decree. Having jurisdiction of the person of the defendants, the
decree can be enforced by contempt proceedings or in some other
personal manner. Judgments or decrees entered against municipal
corporations may not be enforced by levy on property held by the
corporation for public uses.16 This arises out of the public nature of
their duties and the necessity that protects property required for the
exercise of governmental powers. Exemption may be withdrawn or
bargained away by giving the federal authority the power to control
certain acts and situations.' 7 This implies the right to proper enforce-
" People v. Central R. R. Co., 42 N. Y. 283 (1870).
"Brisbane v. Penna. R. R. Co., 205 N. Y. 431, 98 N. E. 752 (1912).
"25 Stat. 209, 210 (1888), U. S. C. §§441, 443, 449, 451 (1928).
"25 Stat. 210 (1888), 33 U. S. C. §450 (1928).
"25 Stat. 209 (1888), 28 Stat. 360 (1894), 35 Stat. 426 (1908), 33 U. S. C.§§443, 444 (1928).
M eriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472 (1880) ; Workman v. City of New
York, Mayor, etc., 179 U. S. 552, 565, 21 Sup. Ct. 212, 217 (1900).
"'U. S. v. The Gov. Rob't McLane, 31 Fed. 763, 766 (D. C. Md. 1887).
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ment of laws enacted necessarily incidental to such control. There is
no exemption in this case because the Federal Government has no
jurisdiction over the situs of the tort and therefore can pass no laws
controlling such territory. The statutes of the United States give the
federal courts the power to punish contempts of their authority.' 8
Thus it has been held that a corporation may be fined for breach of
an injunction.' 9 The penalty is not more than six months' imprison-
ment nor more than one thousand dollars fine or both.20
The controversy could have been arbitrated had the parties been
of such a mind. In its broad sense, arbitration is the substitution, by
the consent of the parties, of another tribunal for the tribunals pro-
vided by the ordinary processes of law. The judges are of their own
selection. This form of settlement is favored because it is more
expeditious, less expensive and is a method of the choice of the dis-
putants themselves. From the very fact of submission, the law
implies a promise to abide by the award when made. Any award
made would be specifically enforced by a court of equity.21
The power to enforce its decrees is a necessary incident to the
jurisdiction of the court.22  A final decree granting relief has been
entered. The decree restrains the defendant from dumping. It is
not altogether impossible that the defendant might refuse to obey the
decree. The sole penalty for failure to obey it is punishment by fine
for contempt. For each successive act of disobedience the plaintiff
would be compelled to bring a new action to punish the contempt.
This is far from satisfactory from the viewpoint of the plaintiff,
who after all, is the one seeking the redress. This question of dis-
obedience is not an idle one. It merits our attention because the
defendant urged strongly that a decree in persoflm could not be
enforced and therefore the action should not have been entertained.
In reply to this I maintain that ancillary to the final relief already
given a decree should be issued 23 to restrain the Supervisor of the
Harbor of New York from granting permits to the city of New York
for the purpose of dumping the garbage. As a general rule, the
judicial power will not interfere with departmental officers of the
Federal Government in respect of matters within their jurisdiction
and control 24 for the reason that the action is in effect brought against
the sovereign which can only be sued with its consent and in a court
of its own choice.2 5 However, the exemption of the United States
- 1 Stat. 83 (1789), 4 Stat. 487 (1831), 28 U. S. C. §385 (1928).
" U. S. v. Memphis & Little Rock R. R. Co., 6 Fed. 237 (C. C. W. D.
Tenn. 1881).
38 Stat. 738 (1914), 28 U. S. C. §387 (1928).
= Perkins v. Giles, 50 N. Y. 228, 235 (1872).
'Root v. Woolworth, 150 U. S. 401, 410, 14 Sup. Ct. 136, 138 (1893).
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed. 1919) §1337; STORY, EQUITY
PLEADING (10th ed. 1892) §338; Root v. Woolworth, ibid.
2, U. S. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 23 Sup. Ct. 698 (1903); U. S. v.
Fisher, 223 U. S. 683, 32 Sup. Ct. 356 (1911).
' State v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 168 Wisc. 198, 203, 172 N. W. 225, 227
(1919).
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from suit does not protect its officers from personal liability to persons
whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded, even by
authority of the United States.26  For disposing of material else-
where than permitted there is a fine of five dollars per cubic yard.2 7
To tow or move any loaded scow without a permit shall be a mis-
demeanor, with a fine of not more than one thousand dollars nor less
than five hundred dollars and revocation of the license of the master
of the scow. 28  Such an injunction would result in making Section
450 of no effect, but it would provide for the execution of the decree
in a manner most satisfactory to the plaintiff.
HARRY B. SAMES.
EASEMENTS BY IMPLICATION-WHEN ENFORCEABLE.
It is ancient learning that an easement is a liberty, privilege, or
advantage without profit which the owner of one parcel of land may
have in the land of another.' The land so benefited is called the
dominant estate and the land so burdened is termed the servient
estate. This interest is created usually by deed or adverse use for
the prescriptive period.2 Since an easement is an incorporeal heredi-
tament it may only be created by grant,3 prescription, 4 or by express
reservation. In the latter case the grantor reserves an easement in
the land conveyed for the benefit of land retained by him. The ease-
ment comes into being by virtue of the reservation.5 Where the
easement is created by grant the grant must contain all the formal
requisites of a grant of land.6 Under the statute of frauds easements
cannot be created by parol.7 For an easement to arise by prescription
there must be an adverse user, open and notorious for twenty years.8
-U. S. v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 220, 221, 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 256 (1882) ; Belknap
v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 18, 16 Sup. Ct. 443, 445 (1895); Philadelphia Co. v.
Stimson, mupra note 6.
'Supra note 13, §449.
Ibid. §443.
'Pierce v. Keator, 70 N. Y. 419, 421 (1877).
' Scanlon v. Manhattan R. R. Co., 185 N. Y. 359, 363, 78 N. E. 284, 285
(1906).
' Canfield v. Ford, 28 Barb. 336 (N. Y. 1858).
' WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY (17th ed.) 31.
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 87 N. Y. 400 (1882). The
reservation must be to the grantor. It cannot be created in favor of a stranger
to the transaction. Beardslee v. New Berlin L. & P. Co., 207 N. Y. 34, 100
N. E. 434 (1912).
' Sweeney v. St. John, 28 Hun 634 (1st Dept. 1883).
Conkhite v. Conkhite, 94 N. Y. 323, 327 (1884).
'Supra note 2 at 363, 78 N. E. 285. "Easements by grant or reservation,
express or implied, and easements arising by prescriptive user, are protected in
equity by injunction in practically all cases, the remedy at law being inadequate
